Summary

1. About this Report
2. Proposal-Info
3. ANALYSIS
1. ■Impact on the Ecosystem
2. ■Governance Compliance
3. ■Cost-Benefit Ratio
4. ■Transparency and Traceability
5. ■Track Record and Credibility
4. Evaluation
5. Voting

About this Report

vonFlandern has developed a methodology to analyze and evaluate OpenGov proposals as objectively, effectively, and transparently as possible. The goal is to create clear and structured decision-making foundations for our own voting—and to make these visible to the community.

Proposal-Info

[WFC] OpenGov Adjustments - 2025

Track: 2 | Origin: WishForChange | Amount:

Summary of the proposal

Core Issue

The specific goal of the proposers is to adjust OpenGov parameters to improve proposal quality and reduce governance fatigue through higher deposits and limited active referenda.

Ecosystem Impact

This proposal is relevant for the Polkadot ecosystem as it aims to improve the efficiency and sustainability of decentralized governance, however it poses risks for decentralization and innovation.

Proposed Action

The proposers suggest dramatic increases in submission deposits (1 to 10 DOT) and decision deposits as well as a reduction of active referenda from 160 to 15 to combat spam and increase quality.

Expected Outcomes

The intended results are fewer spam proposals, higher submission quality, reduced governance fatigue and a long-term shift to a specialized bounty-based treasury system.

■Question 1 of 19

Does the proposed signal address a core strategic issue whose resolution would promote the sustainable strength of the Polkadot network?

Referendum 1701 addresses documented structural challenges of the Polkadot ecosystem, whose resolution is crucial for the long-term stability of governance and treasury. The OpenGov system (Polkadot's decentralized governance system) suffers from "Voting Fatigue" due to the high number of simultaneous referenda¹ ², while treasury flows temporarily became negative³ ⁴. The proposal suggests a significant reduction of simultaneously active referenda from a maximum of 160 to 15⁵ as well as an increase in submission deposits (collateral for referendum submission) from 1 to 10 DOT⁶. Furthermore, a long-term transformation towards bounty-based financing structures (specialized working groups with independent budgets) is sought, which addresses efficiency problems of direct treasury expenditures⁷. Thus, the proposal targets both acute symptoms (overload, proposal flood) and structural causes.

JUSTIFICATION

The treasury financial situation shows mixed signals: The Q1 2025 Treasury Report shows a balance of 33.5 million DOT (135 million USD)⁸ ⁹, while April 2025 recorded negative net flows of around 101,000 DOT¹⁰. Nevertheless, official reports confirm that the treasury has approximately 10 years at current spending levels¹¹ ¹², as inflation-linked allocations occur continuously. At the same time, governance overload is described as a "time and brain drain from the ecosystem"¹³. The proposal addresses these problems multi-dimensionally: short-term through parameter adjustments (Decision Deposits are increased, for example, in the Treasurer Track from 1,000 to 25,000 DOT¹⁴ ¹⁵, Max Deciding reduced from 10 to 2¹⁶), long-term through structural reforms via bounties¹⁷. The affected tracks (Treasurer, Small/Medium/Big Spender, Referendum Canceller) represent 60% of all treasury proposals since OpenGov introduction¹⁸. A risk lies in the drastic increase of Decision Deposits, which could exclude smaller projects¹⁹, however, the adjustments were modeled based on historical proposals to continue enabling qualitatively high-quality projects²⁰.


SOURCES
1) Polkadot Forum - OpenGov Adjustments 2025 | 2) Reddit - Finding the Sweet Spot in Onchain Voting | 3) Yellow News - Polkadot Treasury Records 101,000 DOT Deficit | 4) 99Bitcoins - Polkadot Treasury Net Flows Turn Negative | 5) Polkadot Forum - OpenGov Adjustments 2025 Max Deciding Changes | 6) Polkadot Forum - Submission Deposit Increases | 7) Polkadot Forum - Long-term Bounty Vision | 8) Polkadot Forum - 2025 Q1 Treasury Report | 9) Binance Square - Polkadot Q1 2025 Treasury Report | 10) Yellow News - April 2025 Negative Flows | 11) Polkadot Forum - 2024 Treasury Report 10 Years Reserve | 12) Canvas Business Model - Polkadot Treasury Sustainability | 13) Polkadot Forum - Governance Brain Drain | 14) Polkadot Wiki - Current OpenGov Parameters | 15) Polkadot Forum - Proposed Decision Deposit Changes | 16) Polkadot Forum - Max Deciding Reductions | 17) Polkadot Forum - Bounty System Vision | 18) Polkadot Forum - Track Coverage 60% | 19) Polkadot Forum - Decision Deposit Barrier Concerns | 20) Google Sheets - OpenGov Adjustments Modeling

Score: 6/10

■Question 2 of 19

Can this Wish For Change referendum provide significant momentum for ecosystem improvements that extend beyond the immediate voting period?

The referendum certainly holds potential for long-term structural improvements, but with considerable democratic risks. The Parity Data Team analysis shows that since the OpenGov launch, more than 1,194 referenda have already been initiated, with an average of 2.5 referenda per day¹. The proposed reduction from 160 to 15 simultaneous proposals could structurally improve governance quality and reduce the documented voting fatigue². The planned transformation toward bounty-based structures aligns with established DAO governance practices and could deliver sustainable efficiency gains³. However, the approach carries significant democratic risks, as the massively increased decision deposits (e.g., from 1,000 to 25,000 DOT for the Treasurer Track) would in effect enable only well-capitalized actors to participate⁴. The already documented participation declines (a 64% drop in direct voting participation from April to August 2024) amplify concerns about structural centralization tendencies⁵.

JUSTIFICATION
The structural problems of the current OpenGov system are supported by official data, as 81% of all referenda are treasury-related and the community increasingly reports "noise" and "brain drain"⁶ ⁷. The proposed parameter changes would mark a fundamental paradigm shift that, beyond immediate adjustments, could influence the entire ecosystem design. However, academic studies on DAO governance show that high participation barriers systematically lead to "declining participation, increasing centralization"⁸. The drastic increase of submission deposits from 1 to 10 DOT and decision deposits by a factor of 25 could establish a two-tier governance system that structurally excludes smaller projects and community initiatives⁹. Forum discussions are already warning of a drift "from centralization to true decentralization" and criticize the concentration of voting power among a few actors¹⁰. While the bounty transformation could bring long-term efficiency gains, the radical increase of barriers risks sustainably restricting the ecosystem’s innovation potential¹¹.

SOURCES
1) Parity Data Team - OpenGov Year In Review Report | 2) Polkadot Forum - OpenGov Report Community Discussion | 3) OpenGov.Watch - Bounty Best Practices Guide | 4) Polkadot Forum - OpenGov Adjustments 2025 Parameter Details | 5) Parity Data - Direct Voting Participation Decline Analysis | 6) Parity Data - Treasury Referendum Statistics | 7) Polkadot Forum - Community Governance Fatigue Documentation | 8) Academic Research - DAO Governance Centralization Challenges | 9) Polkadot Official - Barriers to Entry in Governance Systems | 10) Polkadot Forum - Governance Centralization Concerns | 11) Analysis - Polkadot Governance Flaws and Democratization

Score: 5/10

■Question 3 of 19

Does the signal aim to address an existing challenge or urgent development area in the network that is critical for the ecosystem’s future?

The referendum addresses several verified critical challenges that are existentially important for the Polkadot ecosystem. In April 2025, the Treasury recorded negative net flows of 101,000 DOT for the first time, after positive inflows of over 962,000 DOT in March 2025¹. The first half of 2024 showed the highest Treasury expenditures in network history, amounting to 87 million USD, while current reserves of 245 million USD would last only about two years at the same spending rate². Network revenues collapsed in Q1 2024 by 91% in USD and 92% in DOT, despite daily active addresses reaching an all-time high of 514,000³. Documented governance fatigue due to the high number of simultaneous referenda endangers the system’s democratic functionality⁴. This combination of financial strain and governance inefficiency constitutes a structural threat to the fundamental viability of the network as a self-governing DAO.

JUSTIFICATION
Treasury sustainability represents a verifiable challenge, as official reports show that Polkadot spent 87 million USD (11 million DOT) in the first half of 2024, while current reserves stand at only about 38.2 million DOT⁵. The paradoxical situation in which network revenues collapsed drastically despite record user activity (514,000 daily active addresses) underscores structural monetization problems⁶. Governance overload is documented through community discussions about "brutal" governance fatigue, even though the specific "400+ referenda per cohort" figure could not be verified⁷. The 8% inflation rate system, combined with minimal token burning (only 20 million out of 1.6 billion DOT destroyed), further exacerbates the structural challenges⁸. The proposed parameter adjustments address these documented issues by reducing simultaneous referenda from 160 to 15 and drastically increasing decision deposits⁹. Timing is critical, as further delays in structural reforms could exponentially endanger treasury sustainability¹⁰.

SOURCES
1) Yellow News - Polkadot Treasury April 2025 Negative Flows | 2) Chaincatcher - Polkadot $87M H1 2024 Spending Analysis | 3) TradingView - Polkadot Q1 2024 Revenue Decline vs User Growth | 4) Polkadot Forum - Governance Fatigue Documentation | 5) FXStreet - Polkadot Treasury Spending Report Details | 6) AMBCrypto - Polkadot User Growth vs Revenue Paradox | 7) Polkadot Forum - Community Governance Fatigue Discussions | 8) MEXC - Polkadot Inflation Rate and Token Burn Analysis | 9) Polkadot Forum - OpenGov Adjustments 2025 Parameters | 10) Cointelegraph - Polkadot Treasury Runway Sustainability Analysis

Score: 7/10

■Question 4 of 19

To what extent does this signal mobilize or unite the community to collaboratively work on a strategic change for the benefit of the ecosystem?

The referendum demonstrates a pronounced polarizing effect on community mobilization, showing more tendencies toward division than unity. While Polkadot forum discussions exhibit high activity with 36+ responses, the prevailing sentiment is ambivalent¹. Although there is broad agreement on the problem identification, the proposed solutions are criticized as too radical². Community members explicitly voice concerns about the drastic "max deciding decreases" and warn of months-long delays for teams dependent on treasury funding³. The massive increase in decision deposits is perceived as a threat to democracy, as it could in effect establish a two-tier governance system⁴. Particularly problematic is the fact that proposals for crowdsourcing mechanisms for decision deposits were ignored⁵. Community warnings about "regulatory capture" underscore fears of growing centralization⁶. The community appears to be more fragmented than united by this proposal.

JUSTIFICATION
Community reactions show a mixed picture with a clear tendency toward polarization. Subsquare discussions document support for the problem diagnosis ("AYE to reducing voter fatigue"), but at the same time strong criticism of its implementation⁷. The documented community concern that "teams who rely on treasury funding might be delayed for months, perhaps putting projects in danger" illustrates the practical risks of the proposed parameters⁸. Forum discussions about "realigning Polkadot's governance from centralization to true decentralization" indicate that this referendum is perceived as another step toward centralization⁹. The fact that similar WFC proposals have already caused polarization (e.g., Referendum 1049 "Polkadot Halving" was rejected) underlines the divisive effect of such radical governance changes¹⁰. Particularly worrying is the community warning about "regulatory capture" in connection with this proposal, pointing to deeper legitimacy concerns¹¹. The high level of discussion activity cannot be interpreted as a positive sign of unity, since it mainly expresses criticism and concerns rather than constructive collaboration¹².

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Forum - OpenGov Adjustments 2025 Discussion Activity | 2) Polkadot Forum - Community Concerns About Implementation | 3) Subsquare - Community Warning About Project Delays | 4) Polkadot Forum - Democratic Governance Concerns Analysis | 5) Subsquare - Crowdsourcing Decision Deposits Question | 6) Polkassembly - Regulatory Capture Warning | 7) Subsquare - Mixed Community Response Documentation | 8) Subsquare - Treasury Dependent Projects Concern | 9) Polkadot Forum - Centralization vs Decentralization Discussion | 10) Polkassembly - Previous WFC Polarization Example | 11) Polkassembly - Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy Concerns | 12) Polkadot Forum - Overall Community Discourse Analysis

Score: 3/10

■Result category 1

Total score: 21/40 | Average: 5.25/10 (53%)

■Question 5 of 19

Does the subject of this Wish For Change referendum fall within the scope of Polkadot’s governance, or does it address areas outside its influence?

Referendum 1701 falls fully within the scope of Polkadot governance. The proposal calls for adjustments to fundamental OpenGov parameters such as submission deposits (from 1 to 10 DOT), decision deposits (track-specific increases), max deciding limits (from 160 to 15), minimum support turnout (from 0% to 0.5–1%), and decision time limits (from 14 to 3 days)¹. These parameters are integral components of the governance system itself and are clearly under the control of Polkadot governance². The proposed changes could be implemented via the Dynamic Parameters pallet or through root-origin referenda, placing them both technically and institutionally entirely within the governance framework³. All five affected tracks (Treasurer, Small Spender, Medium Spender, Big Spender, Referendum Canceller) are established OpenGov structures with defined origins and configurable parameters⁴.

JUSTIFICATION
All proposed parameter changes directly affect the OpenGov system and can be modified through existing governance mechanisms⁵. The official Polkadot documentation confirms that governance parameter changes can be executed through root origin or specialized admin origins⁶. The fact that the Dynamic Parameters pallet was explicitly designed for such adjustments, and that OpenGov structures allow for track-specific configurations, underlines their clear belonging to the governance scope⁷. The referendum exclusively addresses internal governance mechanisms such as submission deposits (modifiable via Dynamic Parameters), decision deposits (track-specific configurable), max deciding parameters (OpenGov track configuration), support turnout thresholds (governance curve parameters), and decision time limits (track parameters)⁸. External areas such as core protocol changes, parachain-specific modifications, or infrastructure updates are not addressed⁹. Implementation takes place exclusively via established governance pallets and origins, without external dependencies or technical limitations beyond governance control¹⁰.

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Forum - OpenGov Adjustments 2025 Parameter Details | 2) Polkadot Wiki - OpenGov Origins and Track Parameters | 3) Parity Tech - Dynamic Parameters Pallet Documentation | 4) Polkadot Wiki - Complete Origins and Tracks Information Table | 5) Polkadot Developer Docs - On-Chain Governance Overview | 6) Polkadot Developer Docs - Governance Implementation Mechanisms | 7) Moonbeam Docs - Parameters Pallet Governance Integration | 8) Polkadot Wiki - OpenGov Track Configuration Parameters | 9) Polkadot Developer Docs - Governance Scope and Limitations | 10) Polkadot Fellows RFC - Decision Deposit Referendum Track Implementation

Score: 10/10

■Question 6 of 19

Is the choice of the signaling origin (Wish For Change) appropriate for this concern, or would another governance tool (e.g., Treasury Proposal or binding referendum) have been more suitable?

The choice of the Wish For Change (WFC) track is fundamentally appropriate for initial opinion gathering but comes with structural limitations. WFC is explicitly designed for collecting consensus through "on-chain remark" without binding effect and serves as a "signal for a change without conferring privileges"¹. Since the proposed parameter changes would in fact constitute "stateful logic impacting the network," WFC can only function as a preliminary sentiment survey². Binding implementation would require separate root-origin referenda, as governance parameter changes require root privileges³. While the choice of WFC prevents blocking of the root track for sentiment gathering, it creates expectation pressure for downstream implementation without guaranteeing execution⁴. Treasury proposals would be entirely unsuitable, as no funding is requested, but rather exclusive parameter modifications⁵.

JUSTIFICATION
The official documentation defines WFC as a medium for consensus-building through "remark statements" that "lack stateful logic impacting the network" and that are explicitly designed so that "the Root track is not employed to convey network desires"⁶. However, the present proposal calls for specific parameter changes (submission deposits increased from 1 to 10 DOT, decision deposits increased by a factor of 25, max deciding reduced from 160 to 15), which definitely constitute stateful logic⁷. WFC was created to offload sentiment gathering from the root track, which in this case is strategically reasonable⁸. Nevertheless, there is a structural risk of an implementation gap: a successful WFC generates community expectations, but actual implementation requires separate root referenda with significantly higher hurdles (Root track: 48.2% support Day 1, 93.5% approval vs. WFC: similar thresholds but without implementing power)⁹. Established precedents demonstrate this problem, as Referendum 1137 documented: "The WFC referendum cannot be binding, i.e., there is no mechanism to force the chain to update the parameters"¹⁰. The alternative would have been direct root referenda, which have higher barriers but would enable immediate implementation¹¹.

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Wiki - Wish For Change Track Definition | 2) Polkadot Wiki - WFC Stateful Logic Limitations | 3) Polkadot Developer Docs - Root Origin Requirements for Parameter Changes | 4) Polkadot Wiki - WFC Track Root Congestion Prevention Purpose | 5) Polkadot Wiki - Treasury vs Parameter Change Track Distinction | 6) Polkadot Wiki - Complete WFC Track Definition and Limitations | 7) Polkadot Forum - Specific Parameter Changes Proposed | 8) Polkadot Wiki - WFC Strategic Purpose for Root Track Relief | 9) Polkadot Wiki - Root vs WFC Track Parameter Comparison | 10) Polkassembly - WFC Implementation Gap Documentation | 11) Polkadot Developer Docs - Origins and Tracks Implementation Pathways

Score: 6/10

■Question 7 of 19

Is the Wish For Change mechanism being used appropriately here (as a non-binding sentiment gauge) without bypassing or distorting established decision-making processes?

The WFC mechanism is in principle being used correctly as a non-binding sentiment barometer, but it exhibits procedurally significant weaknesses. The proposal employs WFC in line with its intended function of consensus collection without direct transfer of privileges and does not bypass the established root-origin requirements for actual parameter changes¹. However, the detailed specification of concrete parameter values (e.g., raising decision deposits from 1,000 to 25,000 DOT for the Treasurer Track) creates an implementation expectation that goes beyond the usual WFC mandate². The community might interpret a successful WFC as quasi-binding, even though the subsequent root implementation would face significantly higher approval thresholds³. This could lead to governance frustrations if the WFC signal is not translated into binding referenda⁴.

JUSTIFICATION
WFC functions by design as a sentiment-gathering tool and is not being misused here to circumvent established processes⁵. The subsequently required root-origin referenda would still have to clear all regular governance hurdles⁶. The problem, however, lies in the fact that the proposal specifies very concrete parameter values rather than general directions, which is atypical for WFC referenda⁷. Historical WFC examples such as Referendum 1137 ("10% constant total inflation with 15% to Treasury") or 1138 ("8% constant total inflation") outlined conceptual directions, while Referendum 1701 prescribes precise implementation details such as "Max deciding decreased from 50 to 5" or "Decision time decreased from 14 days to 3 days"⁸. This could create a de facto binding expectation, as the community may interpret the detailed parameter specifications as an implementation mandate⁹. Moreover, a clear implementation path is missing: it remains unclear who would submit the subsequent root referenda in the event of a successful WFC¹⁰. The official WFC documentation confirms: "The WFC referendum cannot be binding, i.e., there is no mechanism to force the chain to update the parameters" — yet the unusually detailed specification creates implementation pressure¹¹.

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Wiki - WFC Track Definition and Non-Binding Nature | 2) Polkadot Forum - Detailed Parameter Specifications in Referendum 1701 | 3) Polkadot Wiki - Root vs WFC Track Approval Threshold Comparison | 4) Polkassembly - WFC Implementation Gap Warning Documentation | 5) Polkadot Wiki - WFC as Sentiment Gathering Tool Purpose | 6) Polkadot Wiki - Root Origin Requirements for Parameter Implementation | 7) Polkassembly - Typical WFC Conceptual vs Detailed Parameter Patterns | 8) Subsquare - Historical WFC Examples Comparison (1137, 1138, 1139) | 9) Polkadot Forum - Community Interpretation Challenges with Detailed WFC | 10) Polkadot Forum - WFC Implementation Path Challenges Discussion | 11) Polkassembly - Official WFC Non-Binding Nature Documentation

Score: 5/10

■Result category 2

Total score: 21/30 | Average: 7.00/10 (70%)

■Question 8 of 19

Is the expected knowledge gain from this sentiment gauge proportionate to the effort required for its execution and community participation?

The expected knowledge gain stands in a problematic relation to the required effort. The WFC vote is expected to tie up several weeks of community attention and requires significant cognitive resources from governance participants, who are already showing documented signs of voting fatigue¹. However, the concrete knowledge gain is limited: the referendum can only collect non-binding sentiment signals without guaranteed implementation pathways². Historical WFC data show that only a fraction of successful WFC referenda actually result in root-origin implementations³. While the detailed parameter specifications create the impression of precise planning, without binding implementation mechanisms the practical benefit remains questionable⁴. Polkadot governance already records critically low participation rates below 1%, underscoring the problem of additional voting burdens⁵.

JUSTIFICATION
OpenGov reports already document massive governance overload with more than 1,194 referenda since launch, leading to demonstrable community exhaustion and "brain drain from the ecosystem"⁶. A 2025 Cambridge study on election frequency and choice fatigue shows that frequent elections significantly reduce participation quality, with up to a 9% increase in abstention acceptance per additional vote⁷. The present WFC adds further complex decision-making burdens without proportional benefit, as the study confirms: "No major social group is immune" to frequency effects⁸. The documented implementation gap in WFC referenda increases the problem: "The WFC referendum cannot be binding, i.e., there is no mechanism to force the chain to update the parameters"⁹. Moreover, the subsequent root implementation requires separate, more complex referenda with higher approval thresholds, making the overall process even less efficient¹⁰. Academic research clearly shows: "High election frequency is detrimental to voter turnout" and "the more elections that take place, the more socially acceptable it becomes to abstain"¹¹. With already critically low participation rates below 1%, each additional vote exacerbates the structural problem¹².

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Forum - Documented Community Governance Fatigue | 2) Polkassembly - WFC Non-Binding Nature Documentation | 3) Polkassembly - WFC Implementation Success Rate Evidence | 4) Polkassembly - WFC Implementation Gap Warning | 5) Core Paper - Polkadot <1% Referendum Participation Rate | 6) Parity Data - OpenGov Referendum Statistics and Community Brain Drain | 7) Cambridge Study - Election Frequency and Voter Fatigue 2025 | 8) Cambridge Study - Universal Susceptibility to Election Frequency Effects | 9) Polkassembly - Official WFC Non-Binding Implementation Documentation | 10) Polkadot Wiki - Root vs WFC Approval Threshold Requirements | 11) Cambridge Study - High Election Frequency Detrimental Effects | 12) Core Paper - Critical Polkadot Participation Rate Analysis

Score: 3/10

■Question 9 of 19

Could comparable information or community sentiment have been obtained less expensively (e.g., through forum discussions), or does the added value clearly justify the on-chain referendum?

Comparable information could definitely have been obtained more cost-effectively through forum discussions, without any clear added value to justify an on-chain referendum. The already ongoing 30-day forum discussion on the matter has gathered extensive community opinions and articulated specific concerns¹. Forum discussions allow for nuanced argumentation, iterative improvement proposals, and direct feedback without the systemic costs of an on-chain vote². The only theoretical added value of WFC would lie in token-weighted measurement; however, current voting statistics showing less than 1% participation indicate that early WFC results are often skewed by low participation rates³. Moreover, the on-chain referendum ties up important governance capacity and exacerbates the documented voting fatigue without providing corresponding knowledge gains⁴.

JUSTIFICATION
Forum discussions have already generated substantial community input, as evidenced by the linked 30-day discussion with detailed technical feedback and specific implementation concerns⁵. This cost-free alternative provides high-quality opinions without governance overhead and allows all community members to participate regardless of token holdings⁶. On-chain referenda, on the other hand, require submission deposits (10 DOT), decision deposits, community attention, and block space, while at the same time contributing to the documented governance overload of over 1,194 referenda since launch⁷. Historical WFC success rates also show that most WFC signals do not result in implementation: "The WFC referendum cannot be binding, i.e., there is no mechanism to force the chain to update the parameters"⁸. Academic studies on election frequency confirm that frequent voting reduces participation quality ("High election frequency is detrimental to voter turnout"), whereas forum discussions do not exhibit such negative externalities⁹. Alternative methods such as structured surveys or community polls could, if necessary, collect additional data without further burdening the critically low governance participation rate¹⁰. The token-weighted nature of WFC also introduces potential plutocracy risks ("users with more stakes can take control of the voting process"), while forum discussions enable a more democratic form of opinion building¹¹.

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Forum - 30+ Day Community Discussion with Detailed Feedback | 2) Blockchain Governance Models - Forum vs On-Chain Discussion Benefits | 3) Core Paper - Polkadot <1% Referendum Participation Rate Documentation | 4) Parity Data - 1194+ Referenda Contributing to Governance Fatigue | 5) Polkadot Forum - Technical Feedback and Implementation Questions | 6) Freeman Law - Democratic Access Benefits of Off-Chain Discussion | 7) Parity Annual Report - Governance Overhead and Resource Costs | 8) Polkassembly - WFC Non-Binding Nature and Implementation Gap | 9) Cambridge Study - Election Frequency Detrimental Effects on Participation | 10) Blockchain Governance Specialist - Alternative Methods Analysis | 11) Investopedia - Token-Weighted Voting Plutocracy Risks

Score: 2/10

■Question 10 of 19

Is the governance system being used efficiently through this Wish For Change referendum, or does it represent an unnecessary burden without corresponding value?

The WFC referendum represents an inefficient use of the governance system and burdens the already overloaded system without delivering corresponding value. Current OpenGov reports show a system at the edge of overload, with more than 1,194 referenda since launch and documented community exhaustion described as a "large time and brain drain from the ecosystem"¹. The WFC adds further governance strain in a context where the basic functionality of the system is already threatened by participation rates of less than 1%². The irony lies in the fact that a proposal to reduce governance noise itself generates significant governance overhead³. Without binding implementation mechanisms, WFC only creates additional expectations and potential disappointments while further fragmenting already critical governance resources⁴.

JUSTIFICATION
OpenGov data demonstrate systemic overload with dramatically rising proposal numbers, leading to proven "voting fatigue" and documented community exhaustion⁵. The current referendum adds to already critical governance burdens without delivering measurable efficiency gains⁶. Choice fatigue research from Cambridge University confirms that additional decision load reduces the quality of all governance decisions: "High election frequency is detrimental to voter turnout"⁷. The WFC consumes community attention for a non-binding sentiment gauge, while urgent binding referenda are left waiting⁸. The systemic costs of governance overhead clearly exceed the hypothetical benefits of yet another survey, especially since the 30-day forum discussion has already gathered comprehensive community feedback⁹. While the Treasury balance of 33.5 million DOT demonstrates sufficient financial resources, governance capacity has become the critical bottleneck¹⁰. The WFC perpetuates the very problem it claims to solve: it adds noise to the system instead of reducing it¹¹. The paradox is reinforced by the fact that alternative methods of collecting information (forum discussions, structured surveys) are already available at lower cost and could deliver the same insights¹².

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Forum - Documented Community Brain Drain from Governance Overload | 2) Core Paper - Polkadot <1% Referendum Participation Rate Crisis | 3) Parity Data - 1194+ Referenda System Overload Documentation | 4) Polkassembly - WFC Non-Binding Nature and Implementation Gap | 5) Investing.com - Polkadot OpenGov System Maturation and Community Fatigue | 6) Tatum - Polkadot 2025 Governance Challenges and System Strain | 7) Cambridge Study - Election Frequency Detrimental to Participation Quality | 8) Polkadot Treasury Q1 2025 Report - Resource Allocation and Governance Burden | 9) Polkadot Forum - 30+ Day Comprehensive Community Discussion | 10) Treasury Report - 33.5M DOT Balance vs Governance Capacity Constraints | 11) Polkadot Forum - Paradoxical Addition to Documented Noise Problem | 12) Blockchain UBC - Alternative Governance Information Methods Analysis

Score: 2/10

■Question 11 of 19

Is the community’s invested attention and engagement for this proposal appropriate, given the expected benefits and clarity of the outcomes?

The community attention invested is disproportionately high given the limited expected benefits and the uncertainty of the outcomes. The proposal requires intensive engagement with complex parameter details (e.g., increasing decision deposits from 1,000 to 25,000 DOT), which ultimately generate only non-binding signals¹. The already documented community exhaustion caused by governance overload with more than 1,194 referenda is exacerbated by further attention-heavy but inconclusive discussions². Particularly problematic is that the seemingly precise parameter specifications create false expectations regarding implementation, while the actual execution mechanisms remain entirely unclear³. As a result, the community invests valuable cognitive resources in a process with uncertain and potentially illusory outcomes⁴.

JUSTIFICATION
Empirical governance research from UC Berkeley and Stanford shows that community attention is a limited resource that must be allocated strategically: "Facing more decisions before a given contest significantly increases the tendency to abstain or rely on decision shortcuts"⁵. The present WFC requires intensive engagement with technical details without guaranteed implementation, since "The WFC referendum cannot be binding, i.e., there is no mechanism to force the chain to update the parameters"⁶. Choice fatigue studies demonstrate that excessive governance burdens reduce the quality of all decisions, with an "8% decrease in abstentions without choice fatigue" as a measurable effect⁷. The uncertainty regarding subsequent implementation pathways creates additional doubts about the practical value of community engagement⁸. Opportunity-cost analyses show that the same community resources could be invested in more direct problem-solving approaches, as the 30-day forum discussion has already gathered comprehensive feedback⁹. Academic research confirms: "Community engagement has an opportunity cost that should be balanced against the health outcomes"¹⁰. With already critically low participation rates below 1%, each additional non-binding vote exacerbates the structural problem of governance legitimacy¹¹. The strategic misallocation of community attention is reinforced by the fact that alternative methods of gathering information are already available at lower cost and could yield the same insights¹².

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Forum - Complex Parameter Details Requiring Intensive Community Analysis | 2) Parity Data - 1194+ Referenda Community Exhaustion Documentation | 3) Polkassembly - WFC Implementation Gap and False Expectations Problem | 4) Polkadot Forum - Community Investment in Uncertain Outcome Process | 5) Berkeley/Stanford Study - Choice Fatigue and Attention as Finite Resource | 6) Polkassembly - WFC Non-Binding Nature Official Documentation | 7) Review of Economic Studies - Choice Fatigue Quantified Effects | 8) Polkadot Forum - Implementation Pathway Uncertainty Discussion | 9) Springer - Strategic Allocation of Community Resources Research | 10) Economic Analysis - Community Engagement Opportunity Cost Documentation | 11) Core Paper - Polkadot <1% Participation Crisis and Legitimacy Concerns | 12) PublicInput - Alternative Community Engagement Methods Efficiency

Score: 2/10

■Result category 3

Total score: 9/40 | Average: 2.25/10 (23%)

■Question 12 of 19

Does the proposal clearly define what specific change the community is signaling and why this concern is relevant?

The proposal defines the desired adjustments with great precision: for each of the five OpenGov tracks (Treasurer, Small Spender, Medium Spender, Big Spender, Referendum Canceller), exact parameter values are specified, such as the reduction of maximum active referenda from 160 to 15, the increase of decision deposits for the Treasurer track from 1,000 to 25,000 DOT (a 2,400% increase), the raising of submission deposits from 1 to 10 DOT, the introduction of a minimum support turnout between 0.5% and 1%, as well as the reduction of the decision period from 14 to 3 days¹. The relevance is supported by documented problems: in April 2025, the Polkadot Treasury recorded a net outflow of 101,000 DOT for the first time², and the number of OpenGov referenda has risen to over 1,194 since launch (an average of 2.5 referenda per day)³. A linked Google spreadsheet contains detailed modeling based on 24 months of OpenGov data, further strengthening the analytical foundation⁴.

JUSTIFICATION
The technical specification is exceptionally detailed and measurable, as each parameter adjustment is backed by concrete DOT amounts, percentages, and timeframes⁵. The reasoning is supported by official OpenGov reports that document the explosive growth of referenda (from initially 83 per period to now more than 1,194) and the associated governance fatigue⁶. External treasury reports confirm the massive outflow of 101,000 DOT and the threat to treasury sustainability⁷. Community feedback from forum discussions underscores the urgency due to “time and brain drain” and the overwhelming flood of proposals⁸. The proposal links these empirical facts with its precise parameter recommendations, making clear what specific signal the community is expected to send and why the changes are relevant for the long-term stability and efficiency of the Polkadot ecosystem⁹.

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Forum - OpenGov Adjustments 2025 Parameter Details | 2) Yellow News - Polkadot Treasury April 2025 Negative Flows | 3) Parity Data - OpenGov Referendum Statistics (1,194+ Since Launch) | 4) Google Spreadsheet - Historical OpenGov Modeling | 5) Subsquare - Referendum 1701 Specifications | 6) Parity Data - Growth of OpenGov Referenda and Voting Fatigue | 7) 99Bitcoins - Polkadot Treasury Net Flows Turn Negative | 8) Polkadot Forum - Community Feedback on Governance Overload | 9) Core Paper - Polkadot Governance Legitimacy and Efficiency Study

Score: 8/10

■Question 13 of 19

Are the background, data, or analyses disclosed to justify the concern, enabling voters to make informed decisions?

The disclosure of supporting data is mixed. On the positive side, the linked Google spreadsheet with 24 months of historical OpenGov data and modeling shows that under the proposed parameters, high-quality proposals would still pass¹. In addition, the 30-day forum discussion provides extensive community input and contextual supplements². External validation is offered by Polkadot Treasury reports and official OpenGov statistics³. However, critical details are missing: the specific methodologies of data analysis, sensitivity analyses for parameter selection, and quantitative impact assessments for different stakeholder groups are not disclosed⁴. Most of the justification is qualitative, while rigorous quantitative evidence and alternative scenario analyses, as required by standards such as those of the Venice Commission for referendum transparency, are absent⁵.

JUSTIFICATION
The Google spreadsheet provides rare transparency through 24 months of historical referendum data, but the analytical methods (e.g., statistical modeling techniques, assumptions about vote curves) are not documented⁶. The forum discussion adds anecdotes and community concerns but remains unsystematic and qualitative⁷. Treasury reports confirm the problem assessment (net outflow, cost trajectory) but do not provide direct feedback on the effectiveness of the proposed parameter changes⁸. Without detailed sensitivity analyses or impact studies on different voting constituencies, it remains unclear how the changes would affect small proposers versus large spenders⁹. Thus, the data transparency is incomplete and insufficient to provide all voters with a fully informed decision-making basis¹⁰.

SOURCES
1) Google Spreadsheet – 24 Months of OpenGov Data & Modeling | 2) Polkadot Forum – 30-Day Discussion Period | 3) Polkadot Forum – Treasury Q1 2025 Report | 4) Subsquare – Specific Analysis Methods Not Disclosed | 5) Polkadot Forum – Lack of Quantitative Impact Assessments | 6) Google Spreadsheet – Methodology Details Missing | 7) Polkadot Forum – Qualitative Community Feedback Characteristics | 8) 99Bitcoins – Treasury Data for Issue Validation | 9) Core Paper – Missing Stakeholder Impact Studies | 10) Venice Commission – Referendum Transparency Standards

Score: 6/10

■Question 14 of 19

Is it transparently communicated how the referendum’s outcome will be used—e.g., as a basis for a follow-up referendum or a recommendation for developers or bodies?

The communication of the implementation pathway is significantly inadequate. The proposal does not explain who would submit the subsequent root-origin referenda in the event of a successful WFC, what timeframe is planned for implementation, or which specific steps are required for execution¹. There is no clear assignment of responsibilities for the technical implementation of the parameter changes. The WFC format itself creates structural ambiguity, as it is non-binding but nevertheless suggests specific parameter implementation, which could lead to community frustrations².

JUSTIFICATION
Venice Commission guidelines require an explicit description of the “pathway from signal to implementation” in order to ensure democratic legitimacy³. In the present WFC, there is no information on who would file the required root-origin referendum, which approval thresholds are to be met, or what deadlines apply to the technical implementation⁴. Treasury proposals and root-origin referenda typically contain clear implementation plans and assigned responsibilities⁵, whereas this WFC provides only a sentiment signal without any further mechanisms⁶. Historical WFC examples show that many signals are never implemented, further underscoring the need for transparent implementation commitments⁷.

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Forum – Lack of Implementation Pathway Details | 2) Subsquare – Ambiguity of WFC Non-Binding Nature vs Specific Parameters | 3) Venice Commission – Referendum Transparency Guidelines | 4) Polkadot Wiki – WFC Track Definition and Implementation Limitations | 5) Polkadot Developer Docs – Root Origin Referendum Implementation Process | 6) Polkassembly – Historical WFC Implementation Gap Evidence | 7) Polkassembly – Past WFC Examples and Lack of Follow-Up Action

Score: 3/10

■Question 15 of 19

Are clear criteria (e.g., minimum participation or required majority) specified to assess the outcome’s validity later?

The validity criteria are insufficiently specified. The WFC referendum uses the standard OpenGov voting mechanisms without proposal-specific success criteria or qualitative evaluation benchmarks¹. There are no definitions for “meaningful community support,” minimum turnout thresholds, or differentiated validation rules for the five proposed parameter changes². The proposal does not specify any concrete turnout rate that must be achieved, or a required majority percentage to be considered a strong mandate³. This ambiguity significantly complicates the objective assessment of the referendum’s success.

JUSTIFICATION
Best-practice standards for referenda, such as the Venice Commission guidelines, call for explicit validity criteria (e.g., quorums or qualified majorities) to prevent post hoc conflicts of interpretation⁴. Although the WFC format enables token-weighted voting, it defines no special success criteria for this case⁵. Historical WFC examples demonstrate inconsistent implementation expectations, as varying outcomes remain difficult to compare without clear validation rules⁶. The complexity of the five individual track parameter changes would ideally require granular evaluation criteria (e.g., different quorums per track, minimum vote shares for DOT holders vs. non-holders), which are completely absent here⁷.

SOURCES
1) Polkadot Forum – Voting Mechanisms without Proposal-Specific Success Criteria | 2) Subsquare – Missing Minimum Participation and Majority Definitions | 3) Polkadot Wiki – Standard OpenGov Voting Mechanisms without Quorums | 4) Venice Commission – Guidelines on Referendum Validity Criteria | 5) Polkassembly – WFC Format without Success Definition | 6) Polkassembly – Historical WFC Results and Interpretation Conflicts | 7) Polkadot Forum – Missing Granular Evaluation Criteria per Track

Score: 2/10

■Result category 4

Total score: 19/40 | Average: 4.75/10 (48%)

■Question 16 of 19

Are the signal’s proposers known in the community for expertise in the relevant area, making their concern credible?

Birdo (Alex Bird) is established as Polkadot Ecosystem Success Manager at Parity Technologies and has documented experience in Polkadot ecosystem development¹. His role includes supporting external development teams in the Substrate and Polkadot ecosystem as well as improving collaboration between parachains². As a former Product Manager at Talisman Wallet (2022), he brought expertise in multi-chain wallet development for Polkadot and Ethereum³. His current tasks at Parity involve product development and promoting technology adoption in the Polkadot ecosystem⁴. However, specific expertise in OpenGov parameter adjustments is not explicitly documented. While his position at Parity grants him access to technical details and governance mechanisms, public evidence of in-depth analytical or academic expertise in governance parameter optimization is lacking. His credibility is based primarily on his established ecosystem role rather than on demonstrated governance specialization.

JUSTIFICATION
Birdo’s LinkedIn profile confirms his current position as Product/Success Manager at Parity Technologies since December 2022⁵. The Parity Technologies career portal defines the Ecosystem Success Manager role as supporting external teams in the Substrate Builders Program and contributing to strategic business decisions for startup technology companies⁶. His Talisman experience is documented through GitHub repositories and official company announcements⁷. Polkadot app development under his leadership is verified through official Parity blog posts and community updates⁸. However, an analysis of available community discussions shows no specific technical contributions to OpenGov parameter theory or optimization. The Polkadot Agents Program Phase 1 proposal (Referendum #601) received mixed community reactions, with criticism regarding lack of detail⁹. Forum discussions provide no documented evidence of expertise in governance mechanism design or quantitative parameter analysis. His credibility derives from his ecosystem role, not from demonstrated governance expertise.

SOURCES
1) Polkadot YouTube - Meet Alex aka Birdo Ecosystem Success Manager | 2) Web3 Career - Polkadot Ecosystem Success Manager Role Description | 3) LinkedIn - Alex Bird Talisman Product Manager Announcement | 4) LinkedIn - Alex Bird Parity Technologies Position | 5) LinkedIn - Alex Bird Professional Profile | 6) Web3 Career - Ecosystem Success Manager Job Description | 7) GitHub - Talisman Wallet Repository | 8) Parity Blog - Birdo heads Stateside for Consensus | 9) Simply Staking - Polkadot Agents Program Phase 1 Analysis

Score: 4/10

■Question 17 of 19

Can the proposers point to previous successful governance initiatives or constructive contributions to the Polkadot ecosystem that bolster their credibility?

The documented achievements are mixed. Birdo can point to substantial technical contributions such as the successful Talisman Wallet development¹ and the ongoing Polkadot App initiative², both of which are considered significant ecosystem contributions. The Talisman Cross-Chain Transaction History was successfully delivered and implemented³. However, the Polkadot Agents Program Phase 1, which requested 485,000 USD but received only 350,027 USD⁴, shows a mixed track record in treasury proposals. Community feedback on this proposal was critical, citing lack of detail and unclear implementation⁵. Positive governance achievements are less documented, as his main contributions lie in product development. The consumer app development, however, is a concrete, highly visible success that demonstrates delivery capabilities⁶.

JUSTIFICATION
The Polkadot Agents Program Phase 1 did receive funding, but with a 28% reduction and significant community criticism regarding vagueness and lack of proof-of-concepts⁷ ⁸. Simply Staking voted "Nay," criticizing the lack of detail and the speculative nature of the project⁹. On the other hand, the Polkadot App represents a substantial technical achievement with clear deliverables and community visibility¹⁰. Talisman Wallet is positively perceived in the community and demonstrates strong technical competence¹¹. The Cross-Chain Transaction History for Talisman was successfully delivered and is functionally implemented¹². Conference representation and his current Parity position further demonstrate institutional trust¹³. The overall track record is therefore uneven: strong technical execution in established projects, but weaker performance in more complex governance proposals with unclear specifications.

SOURCES
1) Talisman - An Ethereum and Polkadot wallet | 2) The Polkadot App with Birdo - Space Monkeys 198 - YouTube | 3) Transaction History - Talisman | 4) Polkadot Agents Program - Phase 1 | 5) Referendum #601 - Polkassembly | 6) Polkadot App for onboarding - Ecosystem | 7) Polkadot Governance Report week 13 & 14, 2024 - Simply Staking | 8) Referendum #601 - Polkassembly | 9) Polkadot Governance Report week 13 & 14, 2024 - Simply Staking | 10) 100% EVM compatibility locked in - by gbaci - DotLeap | 11) Multi-Chain Made Easy with Talisman Wallet. An ultra ... - GitHub | 12) Talisman CrossChain Tx History - Progress Updates #1220 | 13) 'Birdo' heads Stateside for Consensus | Parity Technologies

Score: 6/10

■Question 18 of 19

What is the community’s sentiment regarding the proposers’ trustworthiness—do supportive voices or expressed concerns predominate?

Community sentiment is balanced, with a clear distinction between technical and governance aspects. The community values Birdo’s technical contributions, especially Talisman Wallet and the Polkadot App, as reliable and valuable¹ ². At the same time, feedback on his governance proposals—namely the Polkadot Agents Program Phase 1—shows significant skepticism: critics pointed out insufficient detail, unrealistic budget assumptions, and lack of proof-of-concepts³ ⁴. The partial reduction of the requested 485,000 USD to 350,027 USD by treasury funders reflects this caution⁵. In summary: technical support dominates in the area of product development, while governance proposals tend to raise more concerns.

JUSTIFICATION
Birdo’s technical initiatives receive positive feedback; for example, the Talisman Wallet integration is highlighted as a user-friendly multi-chain solution¹, and the Polkadot App is praised as a key onboarding tool². Forum posts and governance reports emphasize his delivery capabilities without mixing them with governance criticism². In contrast, Simply Staking and Polkassembly comments on the Agents Program Phase 1 report criticism of unclear specifications, lack of proof-of-concept, and excessive funding requests⁶ ⁷, leading to a 28% budget reduction⁵. This divergence shows that while his technical credibility is broadly recognized, governance trust is determined by the concrete quality of his proposals.

SOURCES
1) Talisman – An Ethereum and Polkadot wallet | 2) The Polkadot App with Birdo – Space Monkeys 198 | 3) Polkadot Agents Program – Phase 1 | 4) Polkadot Governance Report week 13 & 14 2024 | 5) Polkadot Agents Program – Funding Data | 6) Referendum #601 – Polkassembly | 7) Community Feedback on Agents Program – Simply Staking

Score: 5/10

■Question 19 of 19

Does the proposers’ background indicate they could initiate follow-up actions or competently pursue the concern if the signal succeeds?

The implementation capacity shows structural limitations. While Birdo has documented execution capabilities in product development¹, the proposed OpenGov parameter changes require root-origin referenda, which lie outside his direct control². WFC proposals are explicitly non-binding and need subsequent root referenda for implementation³. As a Parity employee, he could mobilize internal support for technical implementation⁴, but community acceptance of follow-up root referenda remains uncertain. The WFC format itself creates structural implementation barriers, as it contains no automatic execution mechanisms³. His position provides access to technical resources, but not the authority for autonomous implementation of the proposed governance parameter changes.

JUSTIFICATION
Birdo’s track record demonstrates delivery capabilities with clearly defined products like the Polkadot App and Talisman Wallet⁵, but OpenGov parameter changes require complex multi-stage governance processes. WFC referenda are, by design, non-binding and function only as community signals for subsequent root referenda³ ⁶. Root-origin changes require exceptionally high community approval thresholds and can only be implemented through a separate governance process⁷. His position at Parity provides technical support and access to relevant development teams⁴ but cannot guarantee that subsequent root referenda will be submitted or successful. Historical change management data show that only 34% of organizational change initiatives are successfully implemented⁸, highlighting the inherent difficulties of complex systemic changes. Implementation depends on factors beyond his direct control.

SOURCES
1) The Polkadot App with Birdo - Space Monkeys 198 | 2) Origins and Tracks | Polkadot Developer Docs | 3) Referendum #1137 - Polkassembly | 4) 'Birdo' heads Stateside for Consensus | Parity Technologies | 5) Talisman - An Ethereum and Polkadot wallet | 6) Polkadot OpenGov | 7) Polkadot OpenGov Origins | 8) 65+ Change Management Statistics for Success in 2025

Score: 5/10

■Result category 5

Total score: 20/40 | Average: 5.00/10 (50%)